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Any Regulation of Risk Increases Risk 
Abstract: We show that any objective risk measurement algorithm mandated by 
central banks for regulated financial entities will result in more risk being taken 
on by those financial entities than would otherwise be the case. Furthermore, the 
risks taken on by the regulated financial entities are far more systemically 
concentrated than they would have been otherwise, making the entire financial 
system more fragile. This result leaves three directions for the future of financial 
regulation: continue regulating by enforcing risk measurement algorithms at the 
cost of occasional severe crises, regulate more severely and subjectively by fully 
nationalizing all financial entities, or abolish all central banking regulations 
including deposit insurance to let risk be determined by the entities themselves 
and, ultimately, by their depositors through voluntary market transactions rather 
than by the taxpayers through enforced government participation. 
Keywords: regulation, crisis, risk management, value-at-risk, risk; Basel 
JEL Classifications: G18, G21, G28, G38 
 
1. Introduction 
When depositors become anxious about the safety of their deposits in a particular bank, 
they rush to get their money out because the remaining assets are first-come, first-served, and if 
there is not enough for everyone, latecomers get nothing. Such bank runs force banks to liquidate 
whatever assets they had purchased with the deposits, often at a substantial loss. Instead of 
letting the free market determine how each bank invests its deposits, governments seek to avoid 
such runs altogether by offering deposit insurance: depositors are assured their money is safe no 
matter what. The existence of the deposit insurance makes people indifferent to the safety of 
their banks and so they don’t bother running to get their money out even if their bank is on the 
brink of insolvency. Conversely, the lack of deposit insurance makes people concerned about 
safety and imposes discipline on the banks. Peria and Schmukler (2001) empirically document 
the existence of such market discipline on banks in the complete absence of deposit insurance, or 
when deposit insurance is not credible, in Argentina, Chile, Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006) show that deposit insurance indeed causes a significant reduction 
in market discipline in Bolivia from 1998 to 2003, and that the effect of market discipline 
completely vanishes when insurance covers 100 percent of the possible loss. 
The trouble is that deposit insurance removes the responsibility from the depositors to 
determine a safe location for their assets. Any insured bank becomes just as good as any other. 
The Federal Reserve Board and the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service 
sponsor a triennial Survey of Consumer Finances to provide, among other things, detailed 
information about the respondents’ use of financial services. Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and 
Moore (2009) report that for the four such surveys conducted in 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007, the 
number one response consumers cited as the most important reason for choosing their primary 
financial institution was the location of the bank’s offices, with more than 40 percent of 
respondents indicating geographical convenience as their most important reason. The second and 
third most popular reasons were low fees and the ability to obtain many services at one place, at 
about 15 percent response each. Safety and the absence of risk were listed as next to last, at only 
2 percent on average. In short, with deposit insurance, consumers are indifferent as to the 
particular risk each bank runs. 
What does such consumer indifference to bank risk mean for the banks? What would you 
do if you could start a bank with deposits insured by the government? You might invest 
prudently and grow your business responsibly. Or you might buy lottery tickets: if you win, you 
keep virtually all of the profits, and if you lose, you have no personal liability anyway. And as 
we saw from the Survey of Consumer Finances, you are likely to be able to attract depositors 
simply by offering convenient locations and low fees because customers don’t care what kind of 
risk you take: even if you lose, they will get their money back from the government. 
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Hendrickson and Nichols (2001) compared Canadian and American bank data in a historical 
study to conclude that deposit insurance does indeed increase risk taking. Calem and Rob (1999) 
show that even a deposit insurance surcharge does not deter banks near insolvency from 
increasing risk.  
But governments can’t just blindly guarantee the deposits of any financial institution. 
They can’t allow reckless risk taking. So what can they do? They must institute restrictions on 
banks in order for them to qualify for the deposit insurance and its ancillary benefits such as 
overnight lending and borrowing of excess funds and other clearing operations. 
Chief among the restrictions that governments and central banks place on individual 
banks is the amount of risk capital that banks must allocate to support a position. For example, if 
you as a bank want to buy $100 worth of IBM stock, how much risk capital do you need to 
reserve such that you are able to withstand extreme losses without being forced to liquidate 
under duress? 
The most commonly used approach in evaluating the reserve requirement is Value-at-
Risk (VaR). Though the VaR is technically the worst-case loss of a truncated historical 
distribution, it is at heart merely a multiple of the standard deviation of the portfolio value, for 
two reasons. First, regulations often allow banks to use parametric estimation methods based on 
continuous distributions, such as the Gaussian, so long as they apply an additional multiple on 
their resulting number to compensate for fat tails. Second, suppose that the VaR is computed 
non-parametrically using actual distribution history, and that the returns are generated from a 
non-Gaussian distribution with an excess kurtosis. Even in that situation, the VaR is still usually 
some relatively stable multiple of the standard deviation.  
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Thus, governments allow a bank to hold a portfolio so long as the bank sets aside risk 
capital equal to some constant c times the historical standard deviation of that particular 
portfolio. This algorithm has undergone some evolution from the original “Basel I” agreement of 
1988 through the most recent changes (“Basel II”) and the new changes now being phased in 
(“Basel 2.5”) and expected to take effect in 2013 (“Based III”), with the most recent changes 
coming in the wake of the global financial crisis. Broadly, the evolution in regulations has gone 
from a constant depending only on asset class, to depending on the current VaR, to (most 
recently) depending on the sum of the current VaR and the worst-case VaR during a historical 
stress period for the asset under consideration, such as 2008-2009. 
The standard requirement called for risk capital of three times the 10-day 99% VaR. The 
10-day standard deviation is about √10 = 3.16 times the daily standard deviation. The 99% VaR 
is about 2.33 standard deviations, from the inverse cumulative distribution function of the 
standard normal. So the standard requirement in effect called for a market risk reserve 
requirement for a portfolio of c = 3.16 * 2.33 * 3 = 22 times the portfolio’s historical daily 
standard deviation. For portfolios that historically moved about one percent per day on average, 
the risk requirement would have been about twenty-two percent.  
In any event, the regulation has always been some function over past prices and returns. 
The form of the function may change but unless the regulator personally inspects and approves 
each possible trade or portfolio, thus effectively nationalizing all financial services and bringing 
them under purely political control, the only way to regulate is to provide a list of clear and 
objective rules. 
The problem is that any such rules to reduce risk will result in more risk. The crux of this 
paper consists of the following argument. Any objective risk regulation rules discriminate among 
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investment opportunities in the sense that some investments become more attractive than others 
based on the formal regulatory algorithm. Any such discrimination leads to a distortion of 
investment opportunities because banks will tend to switch into the more favored investments, 
and, finally, any such distortion leads to increased individual and systemic risk. 
Duchin and Sosyura (2011) document that bailed-out banks subsequently increase risk, 
and they do so within asset classes, so that the increased riskiness is less apparent. Further, they 
note that the bailed-out banks subsequently appear safer according to capitalization requirements, 
but in fact are much riskier. Thus, they conclude that the response by banks to capital 
requirements may hinder the efficacy of risk regulation. Going further, we show here by a more 
general argument that in fact any risk regulation will ultimately result in more systemic risk. 
Much literature has focused examination on big banks and on comparing various possible 
regulatory changes. Saunders and Walter (2012) note that one implication of risk socialization is 
the likelihood of certain institutions becoming too big or too interconnected to be allowed to fail. 
Gatzert and Schmeiser (2011) find that the benefits commonly attributed to risk diversification 
within financial conglomerates is often overstated. Cao and Illing (2010) analyze optimal 
regulatory responses in the presence of systemic liquidity shocks. By contrast, we do not focus 
only on the biggest banks or on marginally different regulatory proposals, but rather on the more 
fundamental questions of whether or not regulation itself can succeed in reducing systemic risk, 
regardless of the size of the banks. 
Hermsen (2010) points out that Basel regulations do not specify a method of calculating 
VaR, and hence banks will choose that VaR algorithm that allows them to establish riskier 
positions. Our approach here is similar in spirit in that we agree that banks will change their 
portfolio allocation algorithm in response to the regulatory rules. However, Hermsen’s argument 
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can be entirely addressed by a new Basel accord stipulating either more restrictions on the choice 
of VaR model or explicitly specifying how VaR must be calculated. Our finding, on the contrary, 
continues to hold regardless of whatever other regulations are passed, even if the VaR model is 
explicitly specified. 
Kaplanski and Levy (2007) culminate a long line of literature that assumes expected 
utility maximizing banks in a mean-variance framework to examine the effect of VaR regulation. 
They find that there is an optimal VaR-based regulation, although current Basel levels exceed 
that optimal amount. Yet we will show that any regulation will result in more risk. Why the 
discrepancy? Kaplanski and Levy (2007) assume that regulated banks continue to act in a mean-
variance world; in other words, regulations result in a change in allocations but no change in the 
allocation algorithm. Here, however, we argue that there is a substantial behavioral change 
between no regulation and some regulation that results in banks changing the way they determine 
their portfolio.  
The differences between our conclusions and those of Kaplanski and Levy (2007) can be 
illustrated in our main example on VaR-based regulation. They assume that the true future 
variance is known and examine the changes in the mean-variance frontier induced by 
regulations. Here we argue that banks will change their portfolio based on the random value of 
the estimate of variance, that the banks will be systematically biased towards those securities 
whose variance erroneously and randomly appears low, that the future variance of those 
securities should theoretically be higher, and that, as predicted, the future variance is indeed 
higher in empirical tests.  
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2. Theory and Calculation 
For the simplest case, imagine there are m identical securities, each of which has returns 
that are independently normally distributed with zero mean and true standard deviation σ, and we 
have a history of n periods for each of them. Think of m as being a few thousand securities and 
of n as being about sixty monthly returns, or five years of data. 
What is the distribution of the sample standard deviations si of each of the securities? 
Simply by chance, about half of the securities will have sample standard deviations above σ, and 
half below. More specifically, the sample standard deviations follow a χ2 distribution, under 
which the probability of a sample standard deviation being below σ is greater than one-half and 
decreases to its limiting value of one-half as the number of observations increases. For m = 1000 
and n = 60, we should expect about ten securities to exhibit a sample standard deviation less than 
80 percent of its true standard deviation σ, regardless of the particular value of σ. Let us prove a 
specific theorem. 
2.1. Theorem: The Conditional Expected Value of the Sample Standard Deviation 
Suppose that               are independent and identically distributed  (   
 ) 
normal returns and the sample standard variances   
  are defined as usual by: 
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Then we can calculate the conditional expected value of the sample standard deviation as 
a percentage of the true standard deviation for any level   between 0 and 1 as follows: 
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Similar results hold for higher tails by substituting " " everywhere  for " ". 
Furthermore, a constant    converges quickly to 1: 
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2.2. Proof of Theorem 2.1 
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Now, let’s find the expected value of the sample standard deviation, conditional on it 
being in a low percentile. 
 (   |       )  
 
 
∫  (
   
 
)
   
  
 (
   
 
)    
     
 (   ) 
 
     
   
 
 
Using the substitution (   )      , we get: 
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From equation (7) we see that the last expression has the p.d.f. of      under the integral sign. So 
we can rewrite it as 
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To calculate the probability on the right hand side, we use equation (1) to write: 
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thus proving the theorem in equation (1). 
To prove that     , we note that according to Stirling’s formula: 
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Therefore      and this completes the proof. Indeed, the convergence is quick, as even 
for     ,           
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2.3. Response of the Banks 
Suppose that the government-mandated risk capital requirement for each security is some 
constant c times that security’s sample standard deviation. What would be the natural response of 
the banks? 
Much like the lottery ticket bank illustrated above, banks would tend towards buying 
portfolios that are riskier than they appear. A particular security that had a sample standard 
deviation of eighty percent of the true standard deviation would let banks spend twenty percent 
less risk capital that they ought to while maintaining a full exposure to the true risk. And there 
would on average be approximately ten such securities at any given point in time. 
And that is the basic idea. Purely by random chance, a few securities will appear to have 
much lower risk than they truly do. Banks will gravitate towards establishing positions in these 
securities because they are able to use less risk capital on them than on arbitrary average 
positions, and banks do not face significant market discipline for establishing too much risk 
because the government guarantees deposits. Therefore, instead of different banks simply 
holding different well-capitalized risky positions, all banks will tend to hold combinations of 
those few and rare securities that falsely appear to have decreased risk. If banks and their 
customers had to bear this risk, they would avoid holding securities with such low risk reserves; 
they do it only because it is not their risk or their customers’, the algorithm set by the regulator 
allows it, and they are able to earn higher returns on capital through this use of excess leverage. 
While other regulations may aim to preclude each individual bank from concentrating its 
holdings into a few securities, there is no regulation short of nationalization that could preclude 
all banks from investing in the same few assets. So the effect of an algorithmic approach to 
determining risk capital is that all banks will tend to establish the maximum position they 
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possibly can into the very few securities that randomly exhibited lower risk, and thus lower 
required risk capital, than they should have. 
Thus, when any one of these particular securities later experience a typical downwards 
movement, it will appear to be a significantly aberrant move from the perspective of the required 
risk capital and the observed (low) historical sample standard deviation, requiring the banks to 
liquidate those and other positions quickly to raise enough cash to replenish their reserves. And 
so a relatively modest move in a few key securities could suddenly result in the collapse of the 
entire financial system. 
One might argue that because each asset has an unobserved true volatility and an 
observed empirical volatility and nobody knows the relation between the two, it is not possible to 
say if the observed empirical volatility is “too low,” and hence the kind of position-picking by 
banks described here would not likely take place. In other words, how do we know when we 
observe a low empirical volatility that it is not actually an accurate, or perhaps even overstated, 
reflection of the true volatility? The answer is that the likelihood of this happening is scarce: 
most likely, the lowest observed volatility assets exhibit such low numbers because of noise. We 
quantified this claim in Theorem 2.1 and will examine it empirically in the next section. 
2.4. Empirical Evidence 
Is there any empirical evidence for this effect? We use the CRSP database of all stocks 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq (after 1972) and, for each date from January 1932 
through December 2003, calculate the standard deviation of the sixty monthly returns for the five 
years prior, and the standard deviation of the sixty monthly returns for the five year after that 
date. For securities whose history ends less than five years after the date, we use the standard 
deviation of however many monthly returns are available. For each stock we calculate the ratio 
  14 
of the new standard deviation to the old standard deviation. Then on each date we sort the stocks 
based on past standard deviations and plot for different quantile groups the associated ratio of the 
new standard deviation to the old standard deviation.   
Exhibit 1 plots the time series of ratios of new standard deviations to old standard 
deviations for five such quantile groups: for the lowest 1 percent of past standard deviations, for 
the range from 1 percent to 10 percent, for the range from 10 percent to 90 percent, for the range 
from 90 percent to 99 percent, and for the range from 99 percent to 100 percent. Note that each 
group always lies above the next ones. The overall averages for the five groups are, respectively, 
1.85, 1.17, 1.00, 0.81, and 0.56. In other words, stocks with the lowest one percent of past five-
year standard deviations on average experience an 85 percent higher standard deviation in the 
subsequent five years. Thus, empirically as well as theoretically, stocks that look too good to be 
true usually are. 
As banks begin to prefer and invest in the regulatorily favored assets, the prices of those 
assets should increase, at least temporarily through their market impact. Indeed, the low-
volatility puzzle of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) in which assets recently exhibiting 
lower volatility tend to have higher future returns. 
3. Results and Discussion 
One possible response by regulators to this observation is to require the use of more data, 
either by looking further back in time or by requiring the use of more frequent observations. 
The two problems with looking further back are with existence and consistency. Many 
securities simply don’t have that much history so the longer regulators require the historical 
lookback to be, the greater the penalty for younger securities. Furthermore, the character of a 
particular security, especially a stock, may have changed substantially from the kind of company 
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it was many years ago, either because of a change in business focus, or because of a change in 
the risk factor loadings and characteristics of the stock due to growth in market capitalization or 
revenues or a change in value. 
So the alternative remains to require more frequent observations over the same time 
period, for example requiring the use of daily returns rather than monthly returns. Over five 
years, that means that n, the number of periods, increases from 60 to 252 * 5 = 1,260, assuming 
252 business days per year on average. 
As Exhibit 2 demonstrates, continuing our assumption of m = 1000 independent 
securities but increasing the number of periods n does indeed decrease the expected value of the 
sample standard deviation in the bottom one percent. Theorem (2.1) derives a convenient 
formula for calculating such an expectation. For n = 1260, the conditional expected value of the 
0.1 percent tail is 0.93 times the true standard deviation, meaning even the biggest deviations in 
sample standard deviation are on average within seven percentage points of the true risk. 
Does this mean that increasing the number of observation periods solves all of the 
problems of a concentration of risk by banks into a handful of seemingly less risky securities? 
For two reasons, no. First, even a small difference between the required regulatory risk 
capital and the true risk of the position may entice banks to prefer such securities over other 
securities. But secondly, the above analysis misses an important aspect of real-world returns: 
they are not normal. 
One obvious deviation from normality in security returns is fat tails. The normal 
distribution has an index of kurtosis, the standardized fourth central moment, of exactly three. 
But observed kurtosis often exceeds ten times that amount. For example, the kurtosis of the daily 
S&P 500 index returns since 1950 is 25.8. 
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We can simulate fat-tailed returns with the following simple approximation algorithm: 
draw from a standard normal distribution but replace all draws within some small constant ε of 
zero with a large constant jump h of the same sign as the original draw. For example, if ε = 0.01 
and h = 10, then a random draw of -0.005 would be replaced by -10. 
Simulating 1,000,000 such random numbers gives a distribution with a near-zero mean 
(0.002 compared with 0.000 for the standard normal), a very slightly elevated standard deviation 
(1.34 compared to 1.00 for the standard normal), but a very high kurtosis (25.6 compared to 3 for 
the standard normal). In other words, if we standardize the results by dividing by its 1.34 
standard deviation, we are able to use this algorithm to simulate fat-tailed returns. 
Using this distribution, we calculate 1,000 different sample standard deviations for 1,260 
observation periods, the equivalent of five years of daily returns. Exhibit 3 shows the histogram 
of standardized simulated standard deviations. Note that a few securities are near the 0.80 ratio 
again, meaning that adding kurtosis to the distribution to better match empirical returns offsets 
the additional accuracy resulting from using more observation periods. 
Thus, for reasonable values of the number of securities m and the number of observation 
periods n, there will still emerge a handful of stocks that appear less risky than they actually are, 
and which will attract banks to hold them for the same reasons outlined above. 
Could the new requirements of Basel II to add an additional stress term alleviate this 
problem? We can answer this question through simulation as well. Simulate 1,260 returns for 
each of 1,000 securities using the high kurtosis algorithm described above. For each sequence of 
returns, compute both the overall five-year standard deviation and the highest rolling yearly 
standard deviation, and report the sum. Basel II effectively requires a multiple of this sum as risk 
capital. Exhibit 4 displays the histogram of these standardized values as well. Again, there 
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emerge several securities purely by randomness that appear to have much lower overall risk than 
the average security. So the addition by Basel II of “stress” risk does not alleviate the problem.  
The risk incentive problem depends implicitly on the limited liability of shareholders and 
their call option-like payoff structure. Thus, even risk averse shareholders with diversified 
investment portfolios will force managers to increase risk whenever depositors are indifferent. 
Depositors are indifferent if their deposits are insured, such as with the FDIC. Could 
slight changes to the nature of the FDIC alleviate the problem? Limits on the amounts insured 
only matter when they become so low that the transactions costs of opening multiple accounts 
becomes too expensive; thus any reasonable limits on the insurance are in essence the same as 
full insurance. On the other hand, if the regulatorily required fees for deposit insurance from 
each bank only acted to reduce the losses of the insured for that bank, then there would be 
virtually no insurance and depositors would be wary of where they placed their money, and the 
possibility of bank runs would immediately return.  
What about asset classes for which the past does not represent their full risk? Banks may 
prefer assets whose risks are not captured by historical datasets, such as tail risks and out-of-the-
money options where losses are hidden, infrequent, and large. This concern is real and true and 
only serves to exacerbate the problems we describe. The problem is large even when ignoring 
hidden risks, but our approach is conservative and the real risk is larger still. 
Expected returns are also difficult to estimate. Could the two errors offset each other? For 
example, if assets with lower estimates of volatility routinely also showed lower expected 
returns, then banks would be less prone to overinvest in them than otherwise. However, there are 
five reasons why this is not likely. First, as Merton (1980) shows, expected return are even 
harder to estimate precisely than standard deviations. Second, expected returns tend to be less 
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persistent than volatilities. Third, expected excess returns tend not to be statistically significantly 
different from zero in practice. Fourth, even if some assets that appear less risky than they truly 
are also exhibit expected returns that are lower than they truly are, the expected returns would 
need to be even more understated than the volatility in order for the investment to be less 
attractive. Fifth, there would still be other assets that appear less risky than they truly are whose 
expected returns are not also expected to be lower. Thus, the estimation errors of expected 
returns will not offset the estimation errors of risk. 
What about other forms of risk regulation, for instance, if risk regulation additionally 
punished non-diversification, to attempt to discourage overinvestment in the favored assets? 
Then there will still exist some measure according to which some investments or sets of 
investments will appear more attractive to the regulators due solely to randomness. This is true 
for any value function proposed by the regulators. Different value functions produce different 
risks, but the main argument holds: any such measure will introduce additional risk because it 
gives an artificial incentive for the banks to invest into some regulatorily favored securities that 
may look attractive only because of inherent randomness. In other words, different regulations 
may cause different assets to be favored, but there will always be some that differ from their true 
risk. On the other hand, if there are no regulations, the risk of randomness gets more diversified 
across assets and more dispersed across individual banks, thus lowering systemic risk. 
4. Conclusion 
The risk capital that banks allocate to their positions must be set by a regulator if deposits 
are insured. If, as a first option, the regulator determines the appropriate risk capital on a case-
by-case basis, then banks are effectively nationalized and run by the regulator. This has often not 
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seemed like a palatable choice, and so regulators have attempted, as a second option, to craft 
seemingly objective risk measurement rules that banks are required to follow.  
The most common kind of risk measurement rules have been variations of measures of 
standard deviation, and it turns out that all such rules, for any reasonable history lengths, 
encourage banks to invest in a few securities that are riskier than they appear, thus increasing 
systemic risk. 
The results are even more general, though. Even if regulators required a risk capital 
reserve of 100 percent of market value for every security, the risk reserve still would not match 
the true risk of each security, because the price of a security is not necessarily its risk, and so 
banks would still tend to invest in the same few riskier assets. 
Thus, we can conclude that the effect of any objective rules for regulation will result both 
in more risk being taken by each individual bank, and by the risks taken by different banks to be 
more correlated with each other, resulting in a far more fragile financial system than would be 
the case otherwise.  
The only third option is to not regulate at all, and to not insure deposits. This would leave 
each bank, and its customers and depositors, with the ultimate responsibility of determining the 
appropriate risk capital. This option deserves greater consideration in light of the results of this 
paper. In the meantime, portfolio managers, risk managers, policymakers, regulators, and 
taxpayers ought to be aware of this previously unknown source of risk. 
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Figure 1: Time Series of Volatility Ratios  
The ratios of future five-year monthly standard deviation to past five-year monthly standard 
deviation, arranged into five quantile groups by past standard deviations, is plotted on a log 
scale. Stocks with recent low standard deviation tended to have higher standard deviations going 
forward, and vice versa. 
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Figure 2: Expected Tail Sample Standard Deviations 
The formula for deriving these conditional expected values of the ratio of the sample standard 
deviation to the true standard deviation is derived in Theorem (2.1) and plotted here for a number 
of periods ranging from 30 to 1200 and for tail probabilities of 1 percent (top line) and 0.1 
percent (bottom line). For example, for 60 time periods, the expected values of the standard 
deviation are 0.76 and 0.71 times the true standard deviation for the two probabilities 
respectively. 
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Figure 3: Simulated Standard Deviations or Basel I Risk 
There exist several securities in the left part of the histogram near the ratio of 0.8, meaning that 
there will still exist by pure chance some small number of securities that appear to have less risk 
than they truly do. 
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Figure 4: Simulated Basel II Risk 
There exist several securities in the left part of the histogram near the ratio of 0.8, meaning that 
even with the addition of the maximum of a rolling standard deviation to the usual standard 
deviation of returns, there will still exist by pure chance some small number of securities that 
appear to have less risk than they truly do. 
 
 
 
